The Firm prevailed in the Superior Court of New Jersey (Passaic County) today when the Court, following briefing and a hearing, dissolved a temporary restraining order that had been entered (ex parte) against our client, a manufacturer of specialty building coatings, in favor of its former distributor, and denied the former distributor’s application to preliminarily enjoin our client from establishing alternate channels to distribute its products through other parties. The former distributor argued that our client was compelled to renew its exclusive distribution agreement under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (FPA). In ruling in our client’s favor against its former distributor, the Court agreed with each of our arguments as to why the former distributor was not a franchisee under the FPA and, hence, was unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.
The Firm prevailed today in the Supreme Court of New York (New York County) (Sherwood, J.) when the Court, following extensive briefing and hearings, dissolved an ex parte temporary restraining order that had been entered against our client, a real estate developer, by a co-managing member of the parties’ limited liability company, and denied the co-managing member’s application to preliminarily enjoin our client from exercising certain rights under the parties’ Operating Agreement to manage a development project. In ruling in our client’s favor, the Court agreed with our arguments that the co-managing member lacked standing and was thus unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.
The Firm obtained a complete dismissal on behalf of its client, a national life insurance company, in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County (Bannon, J.). Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that the Firm’s client improperly terminated a rider on his life insurance policy. The Firm argued that any breach of contract claim based on the termination, which occurred eight years prior to plaintiff’s commencement of the action, was barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations. As to the fraud claim, the Firm argued that it was simply the contract claim restated and improperly characterized so as to avoid dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. In any event, the Firm argued, a fraud claim could not be maintained for the separate an independent reasons that plaintiff did not plead justifiable reliance on any misrepresentation, nor did he plead fraud with the level of particularity required under New York law. On the strength of the Firm’s motion, the New York Supreme Court dismissed both of plaintiff’s claims.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit today affirmed a judgment by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Simandle, C.J.), which granted the Firm’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ lawsuit brought against our client, the state District Superintendent of the state-operated Camden City School District. Plaintiffs, four former principals and vice principals in the District, alleged that the District Superintendent fraudulently induced their retirement/resignation and deprived them of their due process right to continued tenured employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following extensive briefing, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment because, as we argued, the District Superintendent is a State officer sued in his official capacity, and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. A copy of the Third Circuit’s decision can be found here.
The Firm prevailed on a motion for summary judgment today in the Court of Common Pleas in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, securing a full dismissal of all claims against its client, a manufacturer of waterproofing products. Plaintiff had asserted causes of action against the Firm’s client sounding in strict products liability and negligence on the basis that the manufacturer’s waterproofing product had purportedly failed, causing water intrusion at a building. In fact, plaintiff’s own expert had opined that the product was not defective and did not cause the intrusion, but in any event, the Court, after hearing oral argument, dismissed all claims as to the Firm’s client on the basis that the applicable two and four year statutes of limitations had expired prior to plaintiff’s bringing suit in 2013. Specifically, the Court held that the claims accrued in 2008, when plaintiff admitted to observing water intrusion. The Court credited the Firm’s arguments for why, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not invoke the discovery rule or repair doctrine to toll the statutes of limitations.
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas today, in the wake of motions filed by the Firm, dismissed in full complaints filed against the Firm’s clients, Ashland Inc. and Univar USA Inc., on the basis that Pennsylvania had no personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agreed with the Firm’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit Pennsylvania state courts to assert general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations, even where those corporations are registered to do business in Pennsylvania. This is the first ruling of its kind in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
A Pennsylvania statute provides that, in order to do business in Pennsylvania, all out-of-state corporations must first file a foreign registration statement, and a separate statute says that by filing such a statement, out-of-state corporations submit themselves to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The Firm had previously argued on behalf of its clients that recent landmark Supreme Court decisions Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) rendered these statutes unconstitutional (at least in part), because those cases held that out-of-state corporations could only be haled into court in Pennsylvania on general personal jurisdiction grounds in the most “exceptional circumstances.”
While the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas initially did not credit this argument, it later ordered a hearing to address the issue, in light of even more recent Supreme Court rulings in BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), which solidified and clarified the holdings in Goodyear and Daimler.
At the hearing, Fishkin Lucks took the lead, arguing on behalf of nine corporate defendants that BNSF and Bristol-Myers made clear that Pennsylvania could not assert general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendants–regardless of whether they had registered to do business in Pennsylvania–absent “exceptional circumstances” that plainly did not exist in this case. The Court agreed, dismissing not only all claims against the Firm’s clients but also all claims against all other out-of-state corporate defendants. This decision will fundamentally change the landscape of litigation in Pennsylvania, and more specifically, Philadelphia, as plaintiffs will be significantly inhibited from subjecting out-of-state corporations to the jurisdiction of the State’s courts.
